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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

LE\VIS R. DILLREE and
RETTA R. DILLREE,
his wife; and
FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12030

I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
All italics are ours and are added for emphasis. The
parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court. "R"
refers to Record and "T.R." refers to Transcript of
Record.
1

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain. The State of
Utah, by and through its Road Commission, instituted
a proceeding in the District Court of Summit County,
State of Utah, identified as Civil No. 3790 for the purpose of condemning certain land owned by the Defendants for highway purposes. The only issues before the
Court below were the fair market value of the property
taken by the State of Utah as of the 6th day of March,
1968, and the amount of damage to the remainder, if
any.
DISPOSITION IN LO,i\TER COURT
The Defendant land owners admitted, and the
Trial Court found that the Road Commission was authorized to condemn the property which was the subject
of the condemnation action and that the requisite finding of public use and necessity was made as to the Defendant's property. The case thereafter was set down
for trial on the issues of just compensation to be paid to
the Defendant land owners for the expropriation of the
property condemned and for damages to the remaining
property caused by the taking and the construction of
the highway facility. The case was tried before the
Court sitting with a jury commencing on October 22,
1969, at Coalville, Summit County, State of Utah, and
was concluded on October 23, 1969. At the conclusion
of the trial of the issues, the matter was submitted to the
2

jury, whereupon the jury retired to deliberate and returned a verdict as follows:
"I. Award for the total amount of land

and improvements taken ········-··-···-·-----------·---$32,754.00
2. Award for damage to land and improvements remaining after taking (severance damage) ----------------------------------------------------$ 2,321.00
Total damage ............................................$35,075.00

Isl Jerry R. Marcellian
Jury Foreman
Thereafter Plaintiff filed a Motion for a New
Trial, or alternatively for Remitture which were, after
argument, duly denied by the Trial Court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks that the Judgment On The Verdict
entered in the trial of said case be set aside and that the
case be remanded for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff filed an action in the District Court
of Summit County, State of Utah, for the purpose of
condemning certain lands of the Defendants for the
construction of a portion of Interstate Highway I-80,
said action being identified as Civil No. 3790. The tract
of land condemned by the Plaintiff, as more fully identi-
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fied in the Complaint on file in said action, is identified
as Parcel No. 35 :A and comprised a total of 4.10 acres.
The original tract of land owned by the Defendants at
the time of condemnation consisted of 7.67 acres, and
the land remaining after condemnation comprised an
area of 3.57 acres (Exhbit No. 1) (T.R. 6-12). The remaining land consited of two tracts which were located
on each side of the condemned 4.10 acre parcel. The
easterly parcel comprised an area of 2.66 acres, and the
westerly parcel comprised an area of 0.91 acres (Exhibit 1) ( T .R. 38) . March 6, 1968 was the date of taking, and all evidence and testimony relative to fair market value were directed to said date.
On the date of the taking, the Defendants were conducting a mink ranching operation upon the subject
property, and there was located upon said land the following improvements: residential home, garage, eight
mink sheds, one hay storage shed, and a coral and barn
(T.R. 15, 16, 17). The property is located approximately 1,000 feet north of the center of the community of
Echo, Utah, and westerly across the Union Pacific
Railroad tracks. Prior to condemnation, access to the
property was available via a road which extended westerly from the center of the town of Echo across the
Union Pacific Railroad tracks and northerly and parallel to the westerly side of said tracks to the south-easterly corner of the Dillree property (T.R. 9-14). In the
after condition the remaining parcel of land lying to the
east of the condemned portion retained access by the
same method as in the before condition; however, the
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tract lying to the west of the condemned portion now has
access to a frontage road constructed as part of the interstate freeway development ( T .R. 9).
The Defendants called as expert witnesses .Mr.
Lincoln Jensen and .Mr. Thomas Ha um. Said testimony
was as follows:
Lincoln Jensen:
Compensation for
property taken:
$31,651.00 ('f.R. 68)
Compensation for damage to remainder
1,785.00 (T.R. 70)
(severance damage)
TotaL .. $33,436.00
Thomas Baum:
Compensation for
property taken:
$31,377.00 (T.R. 115)
Compensation for damage to remainder
1,610.00 (T.R. 115)
(severance damage)
TotaL .. $32,987.00
(Rounded to $33,000.00) (T.R. 115)
Defendant Lewis R. Dillree, as one of the landowners, testified in his own behalf as follows:
Compensation for
$32,754.00 (T.R. 38)
property taken :
Compensation for damage to remainder
2,321.00 (T.R. 40)
(severance damage)
TotaL .. $35,075.00
5

Expert witnesses for the Plaintiff were Mr. Nate
A. Smith and Mr. Grant E. Neilsen. Said testimony was
as follows:
Nate A. Smith:
Compensation for
property taken:
$24,058.00 ( T .R. 161)
Compensation for damage to remainder
(severance damage)
396.00 (T.R. 161)
TotaL ..$24,454.00
Grant E. Neilsen:
Compensation for
property taken:
$24,370.00 ( T .R. 208)
Compensation for damage to remainder
(severance damage)
None
(T.R. 208)
TotaL ...$24,370.00
At the conclusion of the testimony and argument
of counsel, the jury retired to deliberate upon the issues
at the hour of 4 :15 P.M. and returned into Court with
their verdict at 4 :35 P.M. on the same date (T.R. 248).
The instructions given to the jury totaled 25 in number,
and there were 22 exhibits introduced and received into
evidence (T.R. 2A). The verdict rendered by the jury
was $35,07 5.00, being the same identical amount as that
testified to by the Defendant land owner, Lewis R.
Dillree.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED
HY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.
In the case of Alverado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16,
268 P .2d 986 ( 1954), the Plaintiff instituted an action
for injuries sustained when struck by the Defendant's
automobile and contended that the Defendant was
speeding in excess of the posted speed limit and that
such speed was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury.
In the process of the trial, the Plaintiff called an experienced police officer who testified that the speed of the
Defendant's car was 35 miles per hour. However, on
cross examination the officer testified that due to an
error in calculation, the speed was anywhere from 25 to
30 miles per hour. The Plaintiff argued that it was this
evidence which required a submission of the question
of speed to the jury. In respect to Plaintiff's contention,
this Court stated:
"The burden was upon Plaintiff to prove the
charge of speeding; such a finding of fact could
not be based on mere speculation or conjecture,
but only on a preponderance of the evidence.
This means the greater weight of the evidence,
or as sometimes stated, such a degree of proof
that the greater probability of truth lies therein.
A choice of probabilities does not meet this requirement. It creates only a basis for conjecture,
on which a verdict of the jury cannot stand."
(Emphasis added.)
7

"Applying this principle to the case at hand,
from the evidence that the Defendant's car was
traveling ''anywhere from 25 to 30 miles per
hour," it follows that it is just as likely that he
was going 25 miles per hour, a lawful speed, as it
is that he was going 30 or any amount in between.
Accordingly, there is no basis upon which the
jury could find from a preponderance of evidence that the Defendant was exceeding the
speed limit."
This Court in the case of State Road Commission
vs. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427 P.2d 749 (1967),
stated that" ... the land owner has the duty of convincing the trier of the fact by a preponderance of the evidence of the amount of damages sustained by reason of
severance." (Emphasis added).
In the case of Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District vs. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 ( 1958),
this Court stated:
" ... As noted above the jury, with divergent
elements of competent evidence before it, can
make its finding in accordance with such of that
evidence as it feels preponderates and such determination is then respected by the appellate
courts. This respected stature, however, is predicated upon the existence of some competent evidence in support of the verdict."
"At the trial all the expert opinion offered on
the subject of severance damage indicated no such
damage would be inflicted upon Defendants;
* * *. This view was expressed by Defendants
own witness upon whose judgment defendants
relied to support the jury verdict. A party cannot call a witness to testify and then select only
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that testimony favorable to his cause, ignorinq
that which is unfavorable."
'
"In the face of the testimony of these men
skilled in property evaluation, the statement by
defendant, John G. Braegger, that damage
would result, cannot reasonably be said in light
of the other evidence to establish the required
basis to support the jury's finding on severance
damage. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
In the case of People vs. Hayward Building Materials Company, 28 Cal. Rpts, 782 (1963) at 786, the
California Court stated:
" ... that an award in excess of the highest
yalue or an award less than the lowest value testified to by an expert witness is without evidentary
support." (Emphasis added.)
\Ve submit that under the authorities cited above
the burden of proof must be met by the land owner. T4e
obvious disregard of any expert witness conclusively
demonstrates the lack of evidence which preponderates
in favor of the Defendant land owners and upon which
the judgment can be supported.
POINT II
THE A\VARD OF THE JURY WAS EXCESSIYE, INFLUENCED BY BIAS ANDPREJUDICE.
One of the grounds for a new trial was that it appeared that excessive damages were awarded under the
influence of bias and prejudice.
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It is a matter of common knowledge that the construction of Interstate Highway I-80 through Summit
County has, of necessity, involved the condemnation of
much of the fertile valley farm lands of the Summit
valley, and thus affected a vast number of the
tants in the relatively sparcely inhabited area. This
Court can take judicial notice of the numerous actions
instituted in condemnation proceedings in the area, as
well as the issues raised on Petitions seeking intermediate appeal from rulings of the Trial Courts ordering
cases of this type transferred to a different county for
the purpose of jury trials, all of which reflect the complexion of the matter under consideration.

In the face of the testimony of four expert witnesses, multiple exhibits, and two days of testimony, the
jury devoted the sum total of 20 minutes in "deliberating" the issues presented.
In view of the testimony of four men skilled in real
estate appraising, and the presentation of their elaborate
testimony and exhibits in the form of demonstrative evidence supporting their expert opinions, how can it be
said that a jury, after careful thought and deliberation,
could possibly return a verdict in 20 minutes on any basis
other than one influenced by bias and prejudice in favor
of a "home town" resident. There can be no argument,
under existing authority, but that a new trial should be
ordered where the verdict of the jury is so influenced by
bias and prejudice that it is obvious from all of the facts
and circumstances that the jury did not, in truth and in
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fact, consider anything other than the testimony of the
defendant land owner and that the verdict was founded
and influenced upon bias and prejudice.
In the case of Porcupine Reservoir Co. vs. Lloyd
,V. Keller Corporation, et al, 15 Utah 2d 318, 392 P.2d
G20, this Court stated that:
"A careful study of the record before us indicated that the jury verdicts were unusually small,
suggesting passion or prejudice or a misunderstanding of the law or facts presented. Under
these circumstances we conclude that the interest
of justice requires that this proceeding be remanded for a new trial as to all defendants."
In the case of 'Veber Basin 'Vater Conservancy
District vs. Skeen, supra, this Court was confronted
with the issue of bias and prejudice but found in that
case that bias and prejudice were not demonstrated because the verdict was within the estimate of value given
by one of the expert witnesses and as such, was supported by competent evidence and, therefore, entitled
to recognition and affirmation by the Appellate Court.
\Ve submit that in view of the fact that the verdict
rendered was in excess of that of any of the expert witnesses and was rendered without the benefit of
deliberation, if any, conclusively demonstrates the existence of bias and prejudice or a misunderstanding of
the law or facts presented, and under such circumstances
justice requires a new trial of the issues.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the authorities cited hereinabove, it seems
patently clear that when we apply the law to the testimony and evidence adduced at the trial, the trial court
errored in denying the Motion of the Plaintiff for a
New Trial. It is inconceivable that reasonable minds
could totally reject the testimony of four expert witnesses and resolve the issues of the subject case in favor
of the Defendant land owners by a "preponderance of
evidence" supported only by the testimony of one of the
defendant land owners.
We are not unaware of the fact that the law recognizes the right of the jury to believe one witness as
against many, or to believe many witnesses as against
one, and to believe such witness upon such testimony as
the jury deems appropriate. However, reading the entire record and considering the period of deliberation,
the extent of the evidence and testimony adduced at the
trial, the numerous exhibits received in evidence and the
complexity of the issues inherent in the proceeding, it is
inconceivable that the verdict of the jury was supported
by a preponderance of the evidence and that the same
was free of bias and prejudice. It is for these reasons
that we respectfully urge this Court, in the interest of
justice, to remand this case for a new trial.
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Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
State of Utah
By BRANT H. WALL, Esq.
Special Assistant
Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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